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Abstract—While the threats in Internet are still increasing and
evolving (like intra multi-tenant data center attacks), protection
and detection mechanisms are not fully accurate. Therefore,
forensics is vital for recovering from an attack but also to identify
the responsible entities. Therefore, this paper focuses on tracing
back to the sources of an anomaly in the network. In this paper,
we propose a method leveraging the Software Defined Networking
(SDN) paradigm to passively identify switches composing the
network path of an anomaly. As SDN technologies tend to be
deployed in the next generation of networks including in data
centers, they provide a helpful framework to implement our
proposal without developing dedicated routers like usual IP
traceback techniques. We evaluated our scheme with different
network topologies (Internet and data centers) by considering
distributed attacks with numerous hosts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, Internet is an amazing playground for the
attackers because there are many users and devices which
can be targeted. Therefore, designing and developing new
protection mechanisms, like Intrusion Detection System [1], is
of paramount importance. While these techniques are helpful
for identifying when an attack occurs, they do not aim at
identifying root causes and origins (responsible entities) of the
attacks which are an objective of forensics. A naive approach
would consider source IP addresses as the origins of an attack
but an attacker can easily impersonate it (IP address spoofing)
[2]. Such spoofing techniques are especially useful for (D)DoS
(Distributed Denial of Serivce) attacks, which are still a major
threat in Internet [3]. In particular, an attacker can send data
directly by forging his own IP address or by impersonating
the IP address of his target when contacting multiple servers
(DNS, web, etc.) usually from multiple zombie machines of a
botnet. This causes flooding replies from these servers to the
victim (reflector attack) [4].
In this paper, we propose a new technique to trace back
to the source of an anomaly1. Our method takes advantage
of Software Defined Networking (SDN). SDN is a recent
networking paradigm which relies on centralizing forwarding
decisions in a controller. It gained a lot of interests and is
currently mainly implemented through OpenFlow [5] which
is the de facto standard. It supports incremental deployment
and is useful for various network management tasks like
monitoring [6]. However, using SDN for forensic purposes has
been very few investigated. Based on OpenFlow, our method
is able to find all flows which are related to an attack specified
in a general way without necessarily mentioning IP addresses.
For example, assuming a web server having been attacked, our
1An anomaly might be an attack, a misbehavior or a misconfiguration. In
this paper, both terms, attacks and anomalies are interchangeable.
objective is to find all locations, and in fact all paths, which
may have connected to this web server on port 80. Hence, it is
helpful for forensic analysis without assuming any source IP
addresses (logged by the server) which are subject to spoofing.
The main contribution of this papers is a traceback ap-
proach relying on SDN, and so which does not require to
deploy any specific tool in SDN enabled network. Our methods
has been evaluated through various scenarios.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II mentions
related work. Necessary background is described in Section III
and our approach is detailed in Section IV. Section V focuses
on the evaluation prior concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
As introduced previously, tracing back anomalies is
strongly related to IP spoofing detection and DDoS attacks.
Detecting DDoS attacks has been widely covered [7] especially
by focusing on the victim (who is under attack?) without
identifying real sources. For example, it is possible to detect
incoherent Time-to-Live value of IP packets supposedly in-
coming from the same host [8]. Even if spoofed IP addresses
are distinguished, it is not possible to retrieve the real addresses
behind. IP traceback techniques (packet marking or logging)
have been proposed to find the origins of an IP packet. Packet
marking consists for a router to mark forwarded packets.
Numerous works have been done to select the packets to
mark and to define the marks in order to limit the overhead
(Probabilistic packet Marking). In [9], the path of an attack is
reconstructed from multiple marked packets with partial infor-
mation. Song et al. focused on authenticating marked packets
[10]. A checksum-based method is given in [11]. A hop-by-hop
reconstruction is proposed in [12]. In a packet logging scheme
[13], the routers have to log the traffic and are requested
when an attack occurs. A major challenge is to limit the
router overhead by sampling packets [14]. All these approaches
have never been deployed at large scales as switches were
not enough flexible to implement new functionalities for less.
However, the programmability introduced by SDN enables it.
Actually, SDN technologies like OpenFlow [5], which con-
sider switches configured remotely by a controller, are highly
supported by equipment vendors and operators. This eases its
deployment in real networks, in particular in data centers2. For
instance, Google’s backbone networks are already OpenFlow-
enabled [15]. Another incentive to deploy such technologies is
that they help to realize various tasks (routing, load-balancing,
quality of service, etc.) unlike previously proposed traceback
2China Telecom and Huawei deploy commercial SDN,
http://www.datacenterdynamics.com/focus/archive/2014/04/
china-telecom-and-huawei-deploy-commercial-sdn, accessed on 06/13/2014
methods. SDN is thus a natural choice for addressing our
problem. In addition, it does not solely focus on the IP level
(layer 3) and can so traceback to the origins of an attack at
layer 2 (Ethernet). Regarding network monitoring, OpenFlow
has been widely used to collect network flow statistics in a
passive way [6] or to do active measurements about latency
by injecting packets [16]. In [17], the authors leverage SDN
in order to redirect traffic to middleboxes which are in charge
of doing forensic analysis.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Software Defined Networking
SDN promotes the programmability of the network by
decoupling the data plane from the forwarding plane. The
key idea is to let the forwarding devices (like routers or
switches) only being affected to the forwarding task while
the decisions about where to forward data are decentralized
to a controller. Hence, routers are not anymore responsible for
running routing algorithms to compute their forwarding tables.
In fact, such a decoupling enables powerful functionalities by
having a controller which, thanks to more resources and more
knowledge, can take better decisions about forwarding. For
instance, at layer 2, the spanning tree protocol [18] creates
a spanning tree for a local network. However, it can be
considered as suboptimal because some links are not used
to avoid loops. Actually, two nodes can be connected by a
physical link whereas the logical path is going through other
intermediate nodes. With SDN, fine-grained routing decisions
can be done. In addition, QoS (Quality-of-Service) is possible
as well as isolation which is very helpful in a cloud context.
SDN might be envisioned as complementary to cloud
resources management by enabling networking through virtual
instances [19]. This illustrates the concept of network pro-
grammability which has been proposed in 90’s but which, at
that time, didn’t get support from many industrials. Nowadays,
this concept leads to a strong joint community of academia and
industrial which has notably led to the OpenFlow [5].
B. OpenFlow
OpenFlow is a major representative to configure and mon-
itor SDN capable devices. The switches are communicat-
ing through the OpenFlow protocol with a controller like
Floodlight3. While the full protocol specification is given
at https://www.opennetworking.org, this section describes the
main components and functionalities, which are particularly in
the scope of the addressed problem (we rely on v.1.3).
The core functionality is to install forwarding rules on
switches. Each forwarding rule is defined by different param-
eters where the most important are the match fields and the
instructions. The match fields represent a filter to apply on
packet headers in order to determine if a packet belongs to the
flow or not. For instance, the match fields can specify what
is the source or destination IP address or subnetwork, source
or destination ports, Ethernet source or destination addresses,
physical port on the switch where the packet arrives, etc.
The instructions is a set of actions. The main one is output
to send the packet to a specific switch port. Packets can be also
3http://www.projectfloodlight.org/,accessed on 2014/05/13
dropped or pushed into queues which are handled by specific
schedulers for performing QoS. Other possibles actions are
modifications to the packets headers like Ethernet addresses
or the TTL (time-to-live). Moreover, each flow table entry can
be associated with various counters for monitoring purposes
like number of bytes, number of packets, duration, etc.
Actually, while a controller can install rules pro-actively,
the most common case is to install rules on demand. When,
a packet is not matching any rule (table-miss), a usual default
action is to send a PacketIn message to the controller for
requesting what actions have to be taken regarding this packet.
For example, the controller uses the FlowMod message to
install a new flow table entry which matches this packet and
all subsequent ones of the flow. Simplified examples of flow
table entries are given in table I where the major used fields are
represented. To ease the understanding, a textual description
of the purpose of the rule is mentioned in the first column.
The rules can also be removed, either on demand from the
controller, or after a timeout occurs. This table also highlights
that differentiating a switch (Ethernet layer) from a router (IP
layer) depends on the installed rules and the same device can
even act as both. Hence, we use the generic term of switch in
this paper independently of the installed rule.
Hence, the processing pipeline of a packet is the following.
First the switch looks for an entry where the match fields match
the packet headers. In such a case, the actions are applied on
the packet (modifications and/or forwarding). There may exist
several flow tables and an action can be to pass the packet
processing to another flow table. Finally, if there is no match,
the switch requests the controller, which then install a new rule
to match the incoming packet. The OpenFlow controller can
also request a switch about its current state, like flow statistics,
through the read-state message.
IV. TRACEBACK METHOD
A. Inputs and ouputs
The main input of our method is an anomaly specified as:
a =< tstart, tend, location, fields >
where:
• tstart: the time when the anomaly starts,
• tend: the time when the anomaly ends,
• location: the location of the attack, i.e. the end host
where the anomaly is detected,
• fields: a set of matching fields in the sense of the
OpenFlow flow tables.
The output is the list of origins (hosts or switches in the
network) of this anomaly.
B. Graph based modeling
We model our network as a directed graph G = (V,E)
whit V vertices and E edges. In such a network, each vertex
represents an intermediate node, i.e. a switch, and each edge
represents a network link. Our goal is to detect what are the
entry points (first switches) on the path of an anomalous traffic.
Textual description Ingress
port
Mac Src Addr Mac Dst Addr Ip Src Address Ip Dst Address Protocol Src port Dst port Instructions
Switching * * AB:CD:EF:00:11:22 * * * * * Forward to port 3
Routing * * * * 1.2.3.* * * * Set Mac src
addr=AB:CD:EF:00:11:33,
Mac dst addr =
AB:CD:EF:00:11:44,




1 * * * 1.2.3.* TCP * 22 Drop
Proxy * * * * 2.3.4.5 TCP * 80 Set IP addr=10.11.12.13,
forward to port 5
Load balancing
1 * * * 2.3.4.5 TCP * 80 set dst addr = 2.3.4.6, For-
ward to port 4
2 * * * 2.3.4.5 TCP * 80 set dst addr = 2.3.4.7, For-
ward to port 6
TABLE I: Examples of OpenFLow flow table entries (* represents a wildcard to match any value)
Each node is associated to a set of tables similar to the
flow tables of OpenFlow: [T0, . . . , TM ].
Each entry in such a table represents an OpenFlow rule.
For sake of clarity, we limit the definition of the flow table as
follows: Ti = {fo, . . . , fN} where a flow entry fi is defined
as a tuple fi =< fieldsi,modificationsi, outputi >:
• fieldsi represents the fields to match and so, for each
packet p, match(p, fieldsi) returns true if the current
packet headers match the fields.
• modificationsi represents the modification that will
be applied to the different header fields of a packet.
Hence, assuming modificationsi(p, p
′), p′ is the
results of applying modifications on p, where p and
o′ are packets.
• output is the output of the packet after the rule has
been executed. To consider most of usual cases that
are usable with OpenFlow, it can represents either a
physical port and so an edge from E, another flow
table or a drop action.
OpenFlow specification allows more functionalities. For
instance, the flow tables can be merged by groups but, while it
can be handled in more complex data structures in our model,
this will impact the understanding and the readability of our
model. Hence, we prefer to focus on the core functionalities
of OpenFlow. Moreover, queuing based QoS is also possible
by forwarding packets to specific queues. In our model, this
corresponds to have an intermediate step for the output of
a flow entry. Since, we are targeting forensics purpose, our
model is sufficient but needs some processing to compress
rules which are successively applied to a single packet in order
to have only one rule with associated matched fields, outputs
and modifications.
We assume that each forwarding rule is expressed as
OpenFlow rules even if some forwarding decisions are given
by usual routing algorithms (NORMAL port). It is not a strong
assumption as such decisions might be also defined using
OpenFlow.
An example of our model is illustrated in Figure 1. Figure
1(a) represents a small topology with few hosts and switches
associated with one or more flow tables. In fact, each output
of a flow table entry is represented by an arrow either pointing
to another switch (physical port forwarding) or to another flow
table, which is the case for R2. If there is a drop action,
this results in the lack of an arrow. In figure 1(b), the model
is represented as a directed graph where there might have
multiple arrows between two nodes, for instance between R2
and R3. This is due to multiple flow table entries with the same
action but usually with different matching fields. However, for
our analysis, information regarding the matching fields and
modifications are necessary. Thus, such a graph requires to
maintain an additional association between each arrow and
an OpenFlow rule as highlighted between R1 and R2. From
a terminology point of view, our graph contains attributed
directed edges.
C. Model analysis
To find the origins of an anomaly, our graph-based model
is analyzed through a depth-first search traversal. Assuming
the anomaly a =< tstart, tend, location, fields >, we will
retrieve all flow tables entries which have been effective
between tstart and tend. This is feasible through periodic
polling from the controller.
The main process is presented in algorithm 1 and based on
the following functions:
• ingoing edges(g, l) returns the ingoing directed
edges of the node l.
• rule(e) returns the associated rule to the edge e as
explained in the previous section.
• inv mod(r, f) applies the modifications of the rule r
in an inverse way to the fields f . If no modification
is defined, it is equivalent to the identity function.
This function is necessary as the matching fields, i.e.
the specific protocol headers, of an anomaly might
have been modified along the network path. However,
a one-to-one mapping cannot be expected since the
rules are usually not specific to the exact anomaly.
For example, a rule could just modify the Ethernet
address for forwarding purposes while the anomaly is
related to a specific TCP port. Also, it is possible to
have an anomaly related to a source IP address while
modifications are applied to an entire subnetwork.
In such a case, the matching fields of the anomaly
expressing an IP address would be then expressed as
(a) Topology and flow tables (b) Graph representation
Fig. 1: OpenFlow swicthes network model
a subnet. These approximations in finding the root
causes of an anomaly will be evaluated in section V.
• matching(r, f) returns true if the fields f match the
rule r, false otherwise.
• tail(e) returns the tail of the directed edge e.
Algorithm 1 Finding origins of an anomaly: origins(l, f, g)
Require: l: location of anomaly
Require: f : header fields expressing the anomaly
Require: g: graph based representation of OpenFlow switches
1: in edges← ingoing edges(g, l)
2: for e ∈ in edges do
3: r ← rule(e)
4: new fields← inv mod(r, f)
5: if matching(r, new fields) then
6: next← tail(e)







Algorithm 1 is recursive and starts by exploring the edges
which may have forwarded the traffic corresponding to the
anomaly. To achieve that, all edges pointing to the location
where the anomaly has been detected are retrieved in line 1.
For each of them, the algorithm applies inverse modifications
based on the associated rules in line 4. In fact, the goal is
to check if the anomaly traffic characterized by the matching
fields f might have been processed by the rule r while such
a rule may have applied modifications afterwards. Hence,
applying inverse modifications is necessary as a first step
before verifying the matching between r and f in line 5. If a
match exists, then the tail of the edge associated in the rule is
considered for further analysis by the recursive process. The
current node being explored is added to the origins of the
anomaly (line 8) discovered by the recursive execution of the
algorithm. In fact, the origins retrieved by the our algorithm
is all switches on the anomaly paths.
For sake of clarity and due to limited space, this algorithm
does not take in account multiple flow tables on a switch but
this is realized by considering each rule in intermediate flow
table as another edge.
V. EVALUATION
A. Methodology
Our approach to trace back anomalies is based on a
deterministic process and is thus able, by design, to find all
the potential paths, and so sources, of an anomaly in the
network. However, the granularity of the defined rules with
OpenFlow will impact on the accuracy of the localized paths.
For example, with highly generic rules like those dedicated
to forward packets to a specific destination address, tracing
back an anomaly targeting a TCP specific port like 80 would
consider all incoming paths towards this host without port dis-
tinction, which thus represents an overhead for future forensic
analysis. For example, it might lead to retrieve useless systems
or traffic logs related to all incoming paths.
Therefore, the goal is not to evaluate how much an anomaly
traffic is covered by the rules, as there is always a rule
otherwise such a traffic would have not been forwarded.
The evaluation focuses on assessing how many nodes are
considered by our approach as having forwarded the traffic
related to the anomaly. The best case would be when there is
exactly one rule per switch on the anomaly traffic path solely,
which exactly and exclusively matches the anomaly traffic.
From a practical point of view, it is not feasible because it
would require to create a rule for all potential anomalies a
priori, i.e. for all combination of unique values (IP and Ethernet
addresses, ports, etc.) in the matching fields in a flow table
entry. However, such an ideal case is considered as a baseline
during our evaluation. Therefore, the main metric calculated





where n∗ represents the number of switches that have
effectively forwarded the anomaly traffic while ntb is the
number of switches which have been retrieved by our method.
If anomaly detection is done in a timely manner, it is possible
to install highly specific rules before the anomaly is ended.
(a) Skitter, sources and destinations randomly selected (b) Skitter, attack node with a degree in
{1, 10, 50, 100}
(c) Fat-tree, sources and destinations randomly se-
lected
Fig. 2: Exact number of switches which have forwarded the anomaly (n∗)
B. Datasets
Two distinct topologies are used:
• a real network topology extracted from a 100 millions
links subgraph of a Skitter4 dataset which has been
constructed by active measurements on Internet.
• a fat-tree topology which is largely adopted for design-
ing data center networking as they are much scalable
than hierarchical topologies [20]. In addition, attacks
within a data center become popular especially with
multi tenant cloud services [21].
A fat-tree topology [22] is tuned through a simple param-
eter k and is composed of 3 layers. At the higher level, there
are (k/2)2 core switches where each of them is connected to
k pods. A pod ((k/2)2 end-hosts and k/2 switches with k
ports) consists of the aggregation and edge layer where each
aggregation switch is connected to k/2 edge switches and k/2
core switches. Each edge switches connected to k/2 end hosts
and k/2 aggregation switches. In our experiment, k = 4 leads
to a topology with 30 switches.
C. Ideal OpenFlow Configuration
In this experiment, the ideal configuration is considered and
so the goal is to compute n∗ in equation (1) assuming different
configurations. In particular, a major parameter impacting on
the number of switches involved in capturing the traffic is
related to the number of sources of the anomaly. Actually, most
of major threats today are distributed. In Figure 2(a), assuming
the Skitter topology, the number of sources vary between 1
and 10000 and n∗ in the same way. It is important to note
that this experiment has been done by considering 100 distinct
targets before computing the quartile values. Due to the lack of
routing information in our datasets, we consider the anomaly
traffic paths as the shortest paths between the sources and the
destination. As shown in the figure, the variations between
each individual target are small and most of of the values are
concentrated around the mean in the box plot. Although the
scale is not linear in the figure for sake of clarity, the increase
in number of switches is almost linear. For instance, around
4The CAIDA UCSD Macroscopic Skitter Topology Dataset, http://www.
caida.org/tools/measurements/skitter, dataset LNK0304
500 switches would forward the anomaly traffic when the latter
originates from 1000 distinct sources. For the fat-tree topology,
the same increase can be observed in Figure 2(c) (the maximal
number of sources is 30 as it is the total number of nodes).
Such an increase is due to a larger number of paths when the
packet is coming from several sources even if some switches
are common to multiple paths.
In Figure 2(b), nodes are randomly selected based on their
degrees (1, 10, 50 or 100) because attacks can even target
switches, routers or middleboxes in the network. Therefore, the
nodes with high degrees are located in the core of the topology
whereas low degrees are representing the nodes at the edge.
Naturally, being located at the edge implies that path from the
sources of the anomaly are longer and so n∗ is higher. There
is a notable difference when there are at least 50 sources.
D. Overhead evaluation
The ratio r considers the real number ntb of switches which
have rules that match the anomaly even if the anomaly traffic
has not been forwarded by all of them. To achieve that, a
proportion p of the ingoing edges (ingoing edges(g, l)) is
considered at each reverse hop from the destination to the
sources in addition of the ones composing the shortest path.
This allows to take in account the approximations due to the
granularity of installed rules explained in Section IV-C.
In Figure 3(a), this proportion varies between 0.1 and 0.9
while the number of attack sources is 100. The overhead
remains limited when the proportion is below 0.3. Even in such
a case (r < 10), it corresponds to traverse almost 8000 vertices
in the constructed graph. However, this considers many paths
including long ones. Figure 3(b) shows the number of addi-
tional vertices at each hop. Assuming a maximum number of 5
hops (which is reasonable for a university network), less than
50 switches are considered to traceback to all the sources of
an anomaly (with p = 0.4) which can be internal or external.
Assuming external sources, limiting the number of hops is
equivalent to have only OpenFlow switches within the internal
network. Thus, our method is able to locate the entry points in
the network (not the exact origins of the attack) in such a case.
Finally, Figure 3(c) highlights the negligible impact when case
of the fat-tree topology of the data centers, which are the most
promising candidates for deploying SDN technologies.
(a) Skitter, overhead ratio r (b) Skitter, additional swicthes (ntb − n∗) at each
hop
(c) Fat-tree, overhead ratio r
Fig. 3: Impact of the granularity of rules which may entail to consider additional routes as traversed by the anomaly, number of
sources = 100, average over 100 destinations
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel approach for anomaly tracebacking
has been proposed. The main motivation is to rely on Open-
Flow compatible switches which tend to be deployed at large
scales in local, backbone or data center networks. We defined a
graph-based model to represent an OpenFlow enabled network
which is then analyzed to identify the potential paths of an
anomaly. This is helpful then to limit the selection of data
(like traffic or system logs) for forensic analysis. However
the granularity of the rules has a great impact on unhelpful
selected paths. Because there is no publicly available dataset
of deployed OpenFlow networks (and so rule configurations),
our evaluation assesses multiple generic configurations (when
p varies) which could then be mapped to real deployment
scenarios. In future work, we plan to extend our approach by
considering flow statistics to weight the anomaly and so apply
a stochastic analysis to retrieve the anomaly paths.
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